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We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members.
Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are
connected on the tree. We present a well de￿ned solution that selects envy-free
allocations from the core.
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1. Introduction
Individuals in a society face many collective decisions: for example, how much tax
to levy, how much to spend on local public schools, and whether to build a community
center. Collective decisions are carried out in groups where we will call coalitions.
￿I am very grateful to Myrna Wooders, an associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their
comments. I would like to thanks Marcus Berliant, Paul Rothstein, Norman Scho￿eld, and William
Thomson for helpful discussions, and participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting 2000 in
Charleston, the 2001 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society in New Orleans,
and the 2004 Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory in Beijing for comments.
1People form coalitions to decide on the provision of public goods: A coalition is
endowed with a feasible set of alternatives. Each individual joins one and only one
coalition, and each coalition chooses an alternative from its feasible set. A partition
of individuals is a coalition structure.
The notion of a Tiebout equilibrium arises from Tiebout￿ s (1965) seminal paper.
A Tiebout equilibrium is a state of the economy where no individual wants to move to
another jurisdiction; cf. Tiebout (1956), Westho⁄ (1977), and Bewley (1981). Other
authors have considered the relationships between the core and Tiebout equilibrium
in economies with local public goods when agents are allowed to endogenously form
jurisdictions (or clubs) for the purposes of collective consumption within jurisdictions.
In the presence of local public goods, the core consists of feasible states of the economy
with the property that no group of agents can improve, by forming new jurisdictions
and/or providing di⁄erent feasible allocations of goods to the group members. Two
early papers showing equivalence of outcomes from these two sorts of solution concepts
with anonymous crowding are Wooders (1978, 1980). More recent contributions allow
di⁄erential crowding and separate the taste types of individuals from their crowding
types (their external e⁄ects on others); cf. Conley and Wooders (1997), Ellickson et al
(1999), and demonstrate that the equivalence of the core and price taking equilibrium
still obtains. A review of this literature appears in Conley and Smith (2005).
Guesnerie and Oddou (1981), and Greenberg and Weber (1986) study the core
in cooperative games with local public goods and endogenous jurisdiction formation.
Greenberg and Weber (1993) and Demange (1994) study a stronger notion of stability:
the intersection of the core and Tiebout equilibria. This intersection is shown to
be nonempty when preferences are single-peaked on a line in the former and when
preferences are intermediate on a tree graph in the latter. Coalition feasible sets are
assumed to be monotonic in both. See Demange and Wooders (2005) for further
discussion of these models and additional references.
We study a public goods provision game where individuals are linked on a tree
graph and their preferences have connected support. This means that for any pair of
alternatives the set of individuals who strictly prefer one alternative to the other is
connected on the tree. An implication is that people with the same preferences are
connected. We also assume the feasible sets of coalitions to be monotonic; as new
2members join, more alternatives become feasible to a coalition . The question is: can
we derive allocations that are both stable and equitable? We use the core as our
stability concept and envy-freeness as the equity standard. An allocation is envy-free
if no individual wants to switch places with another.
Our result relates closely to the following articles. Using Scarf￿ s (1967) balanced-
ness condition, Kaneko and Wooders (1982) develop conditions guaranteeing the non-
emptiness of the core independent of the payo⁄ function in partitioning games. In
related research, Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) study communication games
on graphs where only connected coalitions are e⁄ective. Demange (1994) uses the
same setting with public goods as ours and shows nonemptiness of the core using
Scarf￿ s theorem. We present an algorithm, called the hierarchical dictator solution,
to solve for the core and to select envy-free allocations from the core. This solution
also serves as a constructive proof; Scarf￿ s balancedness condition is not required. We
use a preference restriction that is weaker than intermediate preferences used in De-
mange (1994). The idea of the solution is to utilize the natural tree order associated
with a root and set up a decision hierarchy. Individuals are assigned ranks and make
decisions according to their ranks. Each individual acts as a dictator for individuals
on the subtree originating with her. The dictator chooses an allocation for individuals
on the subtree assuring them of the welfare that they could obtain when they become
dictators.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the hierarchical dictator so-
lution. Section 4 shows that the solution selects envy-free allocations from the core.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Formation of Public Coalitions
Let N denote the set of all individuals in a society. Let X ￿ Rm denote the set
of potential alternatives. Each individual i 2 N has preferences, given by a weak
order Ri, over X. Let Pi denote strict preference and let Ii denote indi⁄erence. The
preference pro￿le of individuals in set N is denoted by R = fRigi2N. A coalition is
a subset S 2 2N (the power set of N). The set of feasible alternatives of coalition
S is denoted by ￿(S). The correspondence ￿ : 2N ! 2X is called a feasibility
correspondence. (Note that a coalition may have an empty feasible set. However,
3individuals cannot form a coalition with an empty feasible set.) To eliminate triviality,
we further assume that there exists S 2 2N such that ￿(S) 6= ?. A society is a list
S = (N;X;R;￿). We make the following assumptions: X is a closed set, Ri is
continuous in X, ￿ is compact-valued, and N is a ￿nite set.1 Each individual joins
one and only one coalition. A coalition chooses an alternative from its feasible set. A
coalition structure C in society S is a partition of N, where C ￿ 2N and (i) S\S0 = ?
for allS;S0 2 C, S 6= S0; (ii) [S2CS = N; (iii) ￿(S) 6= ? for all S 2 C. An allocation
a is a mapping a : N ! X, which assigns alternative a(i) to individual i. Allocation




with xS 2 ￿(S) for all S 2 C such that a(i) = xS for all i 2 S and all S 2 C.
Moreover, there is given a tree graph G on N. A path p in G is a sequence of
distinct edges fi0i1;i1i2;:::;ik￿1ikg; we also denote a path by p(i0;ik). A path is of
length k if it contains k distinct edges.
We restrict ourselves to societies with the following two properties.
￿ The feasibility correspondence ￿ is monotonic: ￿(S) ￿ ￿(S0) for all S;S0 2 2N
with S ￿ S0.
￿ The preference pro￿le R has connected support on tree G: for any pair x;y 2 X,
the set fi 2 N j xPiyg is connected on G.
Connected support requires that the set of individuals who strictly prefer one al-
ternative to the other in any pair is connected. For example, in many models with
public goods, if people are ranked by income (a linear tree), the set of individuals
who strictly prefer more public goods is connected. Connected support is weaker
than intermediate preferences (Grandmont 1978 and Demange 1994) which requires,
in addition, that the set of individuals with the same weak preference over any pair
of alternatives is also connected. Based on the idea that individuals who are indif-
ferent should not play a role in making collective decisions, connected support does
not restrict their positions. When applied to a linear order, intermediate prefer-
ences is equivalent to single-crossing and order restriction (Rothstein 1990), which
are commonly used in the literature (see Gans and Smart 1996 and Kung 2002 for
1These assumptions can be replaced with ￿X and N are both ￿nite sets￿ . All results still hold.
4the equivalence results). The following example illustrates the di⁄erence between
connected support and intermediate preferences.















R has consecutive support but does not satisfy intermediate preferences; R0 satis-
￿es intermediate preferences. The di⁄erence lies in those who are indi⁄erent between
x;y. Intermediate preferences requires indi⁄erent individuals to be in-between those
with strict preferences, while this is relaxed in consecutive support.
Take individual r 2 N as the root of G; we call r the ￿rst level individual.
The rooted tree Gr generates a decision hierarchy as follows: The distance between
individual i 2 N to r is ￿ (r;i) = k if r and i are linked by a path of length k
(this path is unique since it is on a tree). We say that i is of level k + 1. Since
N is ￿nite, there exists an individual who has the maximum distance from r. Let
￿ k = maxi2N ￿ (r;i). Let Ni be the subtree originated from i that contains i￿ s lower
level individuals. Individual i is a ￿higher-up￿of j (i 6= j) if i is on the path linking j
and r, or equivalently if Nj ￿ Ni. The next lemma shows that the subtrees originated
from distinct vertices i and j are disjoint if i;j are of the same level.
Lemma 1. Ni \ Nj = ? if i;j are of the same level and i 6= j.
Proof. Note that any two vertices are linked by a unique path on a tree. Suppose
h 2 Ni \ Nj 6= ?. Then, p(i;h) [ p(j;h) contains a path linking i and j that only
consists of individuals of levels lower than l, except for i;j. Also, p(i;r) [ p(j;r)
contains a path linking i and j that consists of individuals of levels no lower than l.
Apparently, we have found two distinct paths linking i;j; a contradiction to the tree
5structure.
3. The Hierarchical Dictator Solution
The hierarchical dictator solution is de￿ned by a recursive algorithm.2 Take a
decision hierarchy Gr. Each individual is assigned an ￿admissible set￿of coalition-
alternative pairs. This set is obtained by allowing each individual to be a dictator
for all individuals on her subtree. The dictator can form a connected coalition on her
subtree that a⁄ords one of her most preferred alternatives, given that all members of
the chosen coalition are no worse o⁄ than when they were dictators themselves. The
admissible set of i acting as a dictator for Ni is de￿ned as follows.
Add, temporarily, a common worst alternative z to every individual￿ s preferences;
xPiz for all x 2 X for all i 2 N. We will show that z does not play a role in the
￿nal allocation later. Let ￿ X = X [ fzg and ￿ ￿(S) = ￿(S) [ fzg for all S 2 2N. A
coalition-alternative pair (S;x) is admissible to i if (i) S is a connected coalition in
Ni that contains i, (ii) x is feasible to S, (iii) for all other members of S, x is at
least as good as any alternative in their admissible sets, and (iv) x is one of i￿ s most
preferred alternatives among all (S;x) that satisfy i, ii, iii; moreover, we require that
(v) there is no S0 ￿ S such that i to iv are satis￿ed and x 2 ￿(S0). Formally, let Ai
denote the set of admissible pairs for individual i.
First, Ai is de￿ned for the following two cases.
Case 1: Ni = fig. Let Ai =
￿
(fig;x) j x 2 ￿ ￿(i) and xRix0;8x0 2 ￿ ￿(i)
￿
.
Case 2: Ni 6= fig and Aj is de￿ned for all j 2 Nini. Let Zj =
￿
x 2 ￿ X j 9S s.t. (S;x) 2 Aj￿
be the set of j￿ s admissible alternatives. Let ~ Ci be the collection of all connected sub-















￿ ￿ X j S 2 ~ C
i, x 2 ￿ ￿(S) and xRjy 8y 2 Z
j 8j 2 Sni
o
:
2This algorithm is based on a chapter of my dissertation, Kung (2002). Similar algorithms that
utilize a tree hierarchy can be found in Demange (2004) where only connected coalitions that are
connected on a hierarchy can form.
6So, (S;x) 2 Bi if (i) S ￿ Ni is connected and S contains i, (ii) x is feasible to S, and
(iii) for all other members h, x is as good as any admissible alternative in Ah.
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Ai consists of pairs (S;x) 2 W i such that S is maximal for x.
The next lemma shows that the admissible set is well-de￿ned in these two cases.
Lemma 2. In cases 1 and 2, Ai 6= ? for all i 2 N.
Proof. In case 1, Ai 6= ? since a maximizer is guaranteed by the continuity of Ri and
the non-emptiness and compactness of ￿ ￿(i). In case 2, note that
Bi ￿
￿
(fig;x) j x 2 ￿ ￿(i) and xRix0;8x0 2 ￿ ￿(i)
￿
6= ? since i can always form a
one-person coalition. Let Oi =
￿
x 2 ￿ X j 9S s.t. (S;x) 2 Bi￿
. Then W i 6= ? if Ri
has a maximizer in Oi. Since Ri is continuous and Oi 6= ? by Bi 6= ?, we have to
show that Oi is compact. Let Ri (x) =
￿
y 2 ￿ X j yRix
￿
be the upper contour set of
Ri in ￿ X at x. Note that
O
i = [S2 ~ Ci
￿
\x2Zh;h2SniRh (x) \ ￿ ￿(S)
￿
:
All Ri (:) are closed, all ￿ ￿(S) are compact, and all S 2 ~ Ci and all ~ Ci are ￿nite. Thus,
Oi is compact. So, W i 6= ?. Taking maximal coalitions among (S;x) 2 W i, Ai 6= ?.
Ai is de￿ned recursively starting from the lowest-level individuals and then move
one level up at a time until r. For every individual, either Case 1 or Case 2 applies .
In the following, we construct an allocation using the admissible sets. Given a
collection of admissible pairs f(Si;xi)gi2N such that (Si;xi) 2 Ai for all i 2 N, we
7assign coalitions sequentially starting from r. First, Sr forms with alternative xr. Let










L1 (r) is the set of individuals without high-ups in N after deleting coalition Sr. Next,
each Si forms with xi for all i 2 L1 (r).
Suppose Lk (r) is determined for k = 0;:::;m￿1. Let ^ S (m ￿ 1) = [i2[m￿1
k=0 Lk(r)Si.
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Lm (r) is the set of individuals without higher-ups in N after deleting all Si for
all i 2 Lk (r) for all k = 0;:::;m ￿ 1. There is an integer ￿ l ￿ ￿ k ￿ 1 such that
L
￿ l+1 (r) = ? since N is ￿nite. Then, each Si forms with xi for all i 2 Lm (r).
Assign coalitions this way up to L
￿ l (r). Note that all coalitions that have formed
are connected. Let L = [k=0;:::;￿ lLk (r). Thus, fSigi2L is a partition of N. The
collection of pairs f(Si;xi)gi2L constitute an allocation ar
f(Si;xi)gi2N (we denote it with
ar for simplicity). Each pair (Si;xi) 2 Ai is constructed as if i were a benevolent
dictator who assures each member a guaranteed welfare level. This welfare level is
the satisfaction the member could achieve from her admissible sets. This benevolence
is carried over to the ￿nal allocation ar; everyone is guaranteed a welfare level no less
than what she could enjoy from the admissible set.
Lemma 3. ar (i)Rix for all x 2 Zi for all i 2 N.
Proof. For all i 2 N, either i 2 L and ar (i) = xiIix for all x 2 Zi, or i 62 L and
i 2 Sj for some j 2 L and ar (i) = xjRix for all x 2 Zh.
Next, we show that the resulting allocation does not involve the added alternative
z.
Lemma 4. ar (i) 6= z for all i 2 N.
8Proof. Suppose coalition S consumes z. Also, suppose coalition T is adjacent to S
and consumes alternative x 6= z. (Two connected subsets S;T ￿ N are adjacent on
G if there exists an edge ij such that i 2 S, j 2 T.) Note that there is only one edge
ij such that i 2 S, j 2 T. First, suppose j is of a lower level than i. Thus, j has
no higher-ups in T and T ￿ Nj. By monotonicity, x 2 ￿ ￿(T [ i). By construction,
xRhy for all y 2 Zh for all h 2 T ￿ Nj. Therefore, (T [ i;x) 2 Bi. This implies
xiRixPiz = ar (i); a contradiction to Lemma 3.
Second, suppose j is of a higher level than i. Suppose g is the highest level
individual in T (there is a cycle if g is not unique). Thus, (T;x) = (Sg;xg) 2 Ag.
By monotonicity, x 2 ￿ ￿(T [ S). Note that by construction xRhxh for all h 2 Tng
and xPhzRhxh for all h 2 S. This implies (S [ T;x) 2 W g and (T;x) 62 Ag; a
contradiction.
So, every T adjacent to S must consume z. Note that every coalition in allocation
ar is adjacent to another. If ar (i) = z for some i 2 N, then ar (i) = z for all i 2 N.
Note that there exists S 2 2N such that ￿(S) 6= ?. So, there exists x 2 ￿ ￿(N)
such that xPrz. Moreover, xPizRixi for all i 2 Nnr. Thus, (N;x) 2 W r. This is a
contradiction.
De￿nition 1. The r-hierarchical dictator solution for society S is the collection of












i for all i 2 N
o
:
The hierarchical dictator solution is
H(S) = [r2NH
r (S):
It is straightforward from Lemma 2 that the solution is well-de￿ned.
Proposition 1. Hr (S) 6= ?.
The following example illustrates the algorithm in a simple society with three
individuals and three alternatives.
9Example 2. Consider society S =(N;X;R;￿) where N = f1 2 3g, X = fx y zg,
￿(1) = fyg, ￿(2) = fzg, ￿(3) = fzg, ￿(1 2) = fy zg, ￿(2 3) = X, ￿(1 3) = fy zg,
and ￿(N) = X. Individuals are linked according to their labels 1 ￿ 2 ￿ 3 and their





The preference pro￿le has connected support and ￿ is monotonic. Let 1 be the
root individual for example. We construct the admissible sets starting at level 3.
Individual 3 can only form a one-person coalition, so A3 = f(3;z)g. Individual 2 can
form f2g with z or f2 3g with z. (x;y are also feasible but to keep 3 as well o⁄ as
consuming z, 2 cannot choose x or y.) Since f2 3g is maximal, A2 = f(2 3;z)g. Last,
1 can form f1g with y, f1 2g with y, or f1 2 3g with z. Since y is more preferred,
A1 = f(1 2;y)g. We pick (S1;x1) = (1 2;y), thus L(1) = f3g and (S3;x3) = (3;z).
The coalitions f1 2g;f3g with alternatives y;z respectively constitute an allocation
ar. This is the only allocation in H1 (S). H2 (S) and H3 (S) can be constructed in
the same way.
A single-valued solution is sometimes desired. It is, however, di¢ cult to ￿nd a
natural selection of an admissible pair from Ai. There are two sources of multiplicity.
First, there may be multiple coalitions in Ai. Unless the tree is linear and r is one of
the end vertices, the coalitions in Ai do not satisfy inclusion relationship. Second, even
if we can select a largest coalition in Ai, this coalition may support two alternatives
that are indi⁄erent to i. It seems only a predetermined linear order > on X can break











and the new solution Hr (S) is single-valued. Another special case is when there is
no indi⁄erence, then, every Ai = W i is a singleton.
4. Stability and Equity
10De￿nition 2. A feasible allocation a in society S is in the core if there is no coalition
S 2 2N that blocks it. A coalition S 2 2N blocks allocation a if there is an alternative
x 2 ￿(S) such that xPia(i) for all i 2 S.
De￿nition 3. A feasible allocation a in society S is envy-free if a(i)Ria(j) for all
j 6= i for all i;j 2 N.
Envy-free is also de￿ned as a version of Tiebout equilibrium in the literature. It
is combined with the core to create a stronger stability concept. The core allows
a blocking coalition to form only if ￿every￿member can be better o⁄. This means
that a coalition can exclude members, since one cannot join a coalition if her arrival
makes others worse o⁄. On the other hand, Tiebout equilibrium allows an individual
to join another coalition freely and a coalition cannot exclude individual members.
It is possible to make existing members worse o⁄ when joining a coalition. We found
it interesting to use envy-free as an equity criterion, in accordance with the fair
allocation literature (see Foley 1967 and Tadenuma and Thomson 1995).
Theorem 1. For any society S satisfying monotonicity and connected support, if
allocation a 2 H(S), then it belongs to the core and is envy-free.
Proof. Suppose allocation ar 2 H(S) is constructed on Gr with admissible pairs
f(Si;xi)gi2N. The proof is composed of the following three lemmas.
Lemma 5. If S and T are two adjacent coalitions in allocation ar and they have a
linking edge ij such that i 2 S and j 2 T, then
ar (i)Rhar (j) for all h 2 M (ij);
ar (j)Rhar (i) for all h 2 M (ji);
where M (ij) = fh 2 N j ij 62 p(h;i)g.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose i is of a higher level than j. Note
that T ￿ Ni, T [ i 2 ~ Ci, and ar (i)Rixi. First, ar (j) 2 ￿(T [ i) by monotonic-
ity, and (T [ i;ar (j)) 2 Bi. Thus, ar (i)Riar (j) by construction. Second, suppose
11ar (i)Rjar (j); then ar (i)Rjxj by construction. By monotonicity, ar (i) 2 ￿(S [ j).
Let g be the highest level individual in S. Note that T ￿ Ng. Therefore, (S [ j;ar (i)) 2
W g which means (S;ar (i)) 62 Ag; a contradiction. So, ar (j)Pjar (i). Third, suppose
ar (j)Rhar (i) for all h 2 S. Then, ar (j)Rhxh for all h 2 S. By monotonicity,
ar (j) 2 ￿(S [ T). Therefore, (S [ T;ar (j)) 2 W g, which means (T;ar (j)) 62 Ag;
a contradiction. So, there is h 2 S such that ar (i)Phar (j). Finally, by connected
support, there is no h 2 M (ij) such that ar (j)Phar (i), and no h 2 M (ji) such that
ar (i)Phar (j).
Lemma 6. ar (i)Riar (j) for all i;j 2 N.
Proof. Each pair i;j are linked by a unique path that passes through adjacent
connected coalitions. Let p(i;j) = fi0i1;i1i2;:::;ik￿1ikg and i0 = i, ik = j. For all
m = 1;:::;k, either im￿1 and im belong to the same coalition and ar (im￿1) = ar (im),
or im￿1im links two adjacent coalitions, i 2 M (im￿1im) and ar (im￿1)Riar (im) by
Lemma 5. So, ar (i0)Riar (ik).
Lemma 7. There exists no S 2 2N that blocks ar.
Proof. Suppose S blocks ar with x and S is not connected. Let T be the minimal
connected set containing S. That is, T ￿ S, T 2 2N and there is no connected
T 0 2 2N such that T 0 ￿ T, T 0 ￿ S. For any h 2 TnS, we can ￿nd i;j 2 S such that
h is on the path linking i and j. We have xPiar (i)Riar (h) and xPjar (j)Rjar (h)
by Lemma 6 and that S blocks ar. Connected support implies xPhar (h). Hence,
xPhar (h) for all h 2 T, and x 2 ￿(T) by monotonicity. This means that T blocks
ar with x as well. Therefore, we have xPhar (h)Rhxh for all h 2 T. Suppose g is the
highest level individual in T, then T 2 Ng and (T;x) 2 Bg. This contradicts with
xPgxg.
If the blocking coalition S is connected, the second half of the proof applies.
Since H(S) 6= ?, our result means that the intersection of the core and the set
of envy-free allocations is nonempty for any society satisfying connected support and
12monotonicity.
5. Conclusion
We study the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods to
members. Allocations that are both stable and equitable exist under the following
two assumptions. First, coalitions can a⁄ord more as new members join. Second,
people are linked on a tree graph and the set of individuals with the same strict
preferences over a pair of alternatives is connected. The most common example
of a tree graph used in the literature is the linear order. For example, people are
ranked by income or taste in many models with public goods. We present a well-
de￿ned algorithm to construct envy-free allocations that also belong to the core. This
solution can be further motivated by a noncooperative story of how coalitions form,
based on the following observation: Policies are usually advocated by a few leaders.
Others, evaluating the proposals, decide whether to follow the leaders or not. This
suggests that policy leaders, who announce public alternatives, may serve the roles
of benevolent dictators and initiate the formation of coalitions. In the process, a
dictator should give coalition members enough welfare so that they will not break o⁄
and form a new coalition them selves.
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